Reputation Management Systems in Peer-to-Peer Networks

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Peer-to-Peer Systems

- Peer-to-peer networks are characterized by:
  - presence of heterogeneous devices
  - the possible coexistence of multiple administrative domains
  - high dynamicity -> churn
  - lack of a centralized authority -> self-management
- New communication paradigms:
  - User-centric – mainly strangers
- Can we define a Web of Trust?
  - A worldwide PKI is difficult to achieve
  - A PGP-like solution might require personal acquaintances

➔ In many cases defining the risk of an interaction is more useful than unconditional trust.

Threats: Adversarial Model

- Two broader classes of attack sources:
  - Selfish nodes
  - Malicious nodes
- Selfish or **rational** nodes
  - Maximize their own utility by prediction of the transactions' outcome
  - Selfish behavior prevents the realization of the system objective
  - ➔ Do not share the content/data they own (free-riders) or contribute with minimal resources
- Malicious nodes
  - Actively attack the system with the intent of disrupting the normal functionality
  - False content – virus

In reality the fraction of malicious nodes is low compared to free-riders

Adversarial Model: Identity and Trust

- Sybil attack
  - Forge identities and appear in the system with new identifiers – multiple identities
- Whitewashing
  - Change identity after behaving maliciously
- Impersonation
  - Steal an identity
- Repudiation
  - Deny an action
- DoS
  - Saturate resources to deny services to legitimate users

Cryptography-based solutions

Adversarial Model: Behavioral threats

- Inauthentic
  - Contribute with different content from requested
- Traitors
  - Behave inconsistently in transactions
- Collusion
  - Join a "community" to damage the system
- Front peers
  - Promote malicious activity of other nodes
- Bad Mouthing
  - Send false information on other nodes
- Ballot Stuffing
  - Report false transactions to increase reputation

Soft-security solutions

Soft-security solutions

- What is the common goal?
  - Nodes must fulfill their obligation toward the system and other nodes
  - ➔ Incentives for cooperation
- Theoretical approaches:
  - Mechanism design
  - Game theory

Simplifications must be made to study the complexity of networked systems

Useful to understand the behaviour of rational nodes

- Monetary scheme
  - Needs to have tamper-proof hardware
  - Accounting infrastructure
- Service Differentiation

Social science



(a) Direct Reciprocity (b) Indirect Reciprocity

- Reciprocal altruism: entities do not expect any service in return
- Indirect reciprocity possible only if transactions are monitored

Reputation

- Peer-to-peer systems must create and maintain trust to function properly.
  - Provision trust is users' knowledge about the reliability of authenticated parties
- Reputation is an important component of all human (and machine) interactions



Trust transitivity

Reputation Management Systems

- Create a framework to foster cooperation
- Provide a sense of trust to nodes that are willing to cooperate
- Reputation management systems to be useful must have three properties:
  - Nodes should last for long in the system
  - Nodes should distribute feedbacks
  - Feedbacks should be useful to the community
- Additional properties:
  - Anonymity
  - Minimal overhead (storage, computation, messages)

Reputation Management Systems:

Definitions and Metrics

Reputation types and goal

- The type of trust is application dependent:
  - Opinion

Opinion is the judgment that a node forms after a transaction on the quality of service received by the counter part.
It is personal and the scope is limited to a single interaction.
An opinion forms the so called private or first hand information resulting from own experience.

Reputation types and goal

- The type of trust is application dependent:
  - Opinion
  - Credibility of reporting nodes

Credibility is the confidence that a node forms on the judging capabilities of another node in reporting opinions.
It is personal and called second order reputation.

Reputation types and goal

- The type of trust is application dependent:
  - Opinion
  - Credibility of reporting nodes
  - Reputation (community judgment)

Reputation measures the trustworthiness of a peer in a system.
It is the global system-wide view of a node
or what is believed about this node.
In short, reputation is the collective measure of trustworthiness
based on the judgement of a community. It is quantified and it is calculated
by considering the action of a node in the view of a community of users.

Reputation types and goal

- The type of trust is application dependent:
  - Opinion
  - Credibility of reporting nodes
  - Reputation (community judgment)

- Reputation to be useful must be objective
  - Algorithms for aggregation of reported values

- The goal of the reputation might be context and application dependent:
  - A node can be trustworthy for providing service of type 1 or/and untrustworthy for providing service of type 2

Trust

Trust is a relationship of reliance and decision in social science.
A trusted party proves to benefit the belief of other peers to fulfill its obligation.
The definition of trust might include also the concept of risk,
when the value of the outcome of a transaction is high and
there exists the probability of failure.
The concept of trust is stronger than reputation as a node risks in person.

- The trustworthiness of the node is subjective
  - Function of reputation and opinion
  - Quantification of the risk

$$T_{xj} = (1 - w_p)O^{avg} + w_p \frac{\sum_d R_{dj}^{avg} \cdot C_{xd}}{\sum_d C_{xd}}$$

Peer-to-peer system: layered structure



System definition

- In a reputation management system the reputation information needs to be
  1) collected from the feedback providers (how a node behaved in the past) – reactive, proactive or hybrid approach
  2) aggregated to form a useful measure of trustworthiness (where?)
  3) disseminated to members requesting the reputation value of a particular node

- A reputation management system needs to implement three distinct functions.

Reputation aggregation: where?

- Transacting Node
- All Nodes
- Central Database
- One-hop Neighbours
- Multi-hop Neighbours
- Designated agents: algorithm dependent -> Hash function

Sergio Marti and Hector Garcia-Molina. Taxonomy of trust: Categorizing P2P reputation systems. Computer Netowkrs, 50(4):472–484, 2006.

Simple algorithms for aggregation

- Average
- Weighted aggregation:
  - Age of the input ($e^{-\gamma t}$ where α depends on network conditions and characterize the aging)

$$R_{xj} = \frac{\sum_i F_i e^{-\gamma t_i}}{\sum_i e^{-\gamma t_i}}$$

  - Likelihood a node lies for reputation values (C credibility factor)

$$R_{xj} = \frac{\sum_i F_{ij}^{avg} \cdot C_{xi}}{\sum_i C_{xi}}$$

More complex mechanisms

- Beta probability density function

$$Beta(\theta, \alpha, \beta) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha+\beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)}\theta^{\alpha-1}(1-\theta)^{\beta-1}$$

α=p+1 β+n+1, Γ is the Gamma Function

- Friend of friend
  - Nodes are vertices of the graph

$$R_{xj} = \sum_{e \in incoming(j)} w_e \cdot \frac{R_u j}{\sum_{f \in \text{incoming}(j)} R_u}$$

Relevant "context" information

- Importance of the transaction
  → opportunistic model
- Communication model
  → network capacity and topology
- Nodes capabilities:
  - computation
  - storage

Collection of feedbacks

- This is essential as the trustworthiness of a node is dependant on how a node has behaved in the past.
- The gathered information represents the input to the reputation aggregation function.
- Possible approaches:
  - Reactive
  - Proactive
  - Hybrid (Proactive and reactive)

Collection of feedbacks: reactive



Request for feedbacks

Collection of feedbacks: reactive



Send feedbacks

Collection of feedbacks: proactive



Interaction

Collection of feedbacks: proactive



Send feedback

Dissemination of Trust

- This can be done with similar techniques like collecting feedbacks:
  - Reactive
  - Proactive
- Proactive schemes require the receiving node to store trust information
  - Recent information can be more valuable ---> timestamps

Metrics

- Success Rate $= \frac{\#Tr_{good} + \#Av_{malicious}}{Total\ \#\ of\ transactions}$
- Detection of malicious nodes
  - ➔ Reputation value
- Communication overhead
  - ➔ Messages to send reputation information
- Computational overhead
  - ➔ Cost to process messages
- Storage
  - ➔ Maintenance of the history

System Architecture



System Architecture



Evaluate trust for j



Communication Overhead

- Parameters
  - Iterations 45,000
  - Deterministic threshold 0.5
  - Malicious nodes 30%
  - Malicious: transaction and feedback





Proactive approach

Reactive approach (2,500)









Nodes 100

Proactive

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

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

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

Nodes 1,000

Proactive

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

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

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

Nodes 100

Reactive 2,500

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

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

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

Nodes 1,000

Reactive 2,500

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

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

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

Considerations

- Communication overhead must be considered to evaluate the benefits
- The design depends on the underlying topology and network
- The correct estimation of reputation depends on:
  - Amount of historical information
  - Size of the system
  - Frequency of interaction

ROCQ

How ROQC Works

- Users send feedback after every transaction
- Feedback is aggregated to form each user's reputation
- Collection, storage, aggregation and dissemination of trust data happens in a distributed fashion

The ROQC Scheme

- Reputation of node formed by averaging opinions of all its transaction partners
  - Global measure of the goodness of a node
  - Result of information provided by others
- Opinion is formed by a node based on how other nodes have behaved during a transaction
  - Historical data about other nodes
  - Result of first-hand interaction
- Quality represents node's confidence in an opinion that it reports
- Credibility measures node's honesty in reputation system
  - A node may "behave" well but not give accurate information about other nodes' behavior
  - A node weighs trust values it receives from other nodes by the credibility of the reporting node

The role of "Credibility"

- Without credibility a system will be open to attacks based on falsified opinions
  - Nothing prevents me from lying about your behavior
- Credibility of a user is modified based on agreement
- Credibility modification is influenced by reported quality

The role of "Quality"

- A user's confidence in an opinion that it reports
- Wrong opinions can cause loss of credibility
- A user may not be sure of its opinion
- Some interactions are more important than others
- Measured as confidence level that actual trust rating lies within r% of opinion

ROCQ: Equations

$$R_{mj} = \frac{\sum_i O_{ij}^{avg} \cdot C_{mi} \cdot Q_{ij}}{\sum_i C_{mi} \cdot Q_{ij}}$$

$$C_{mi}^{k+1} = \begin{cases} C_{mi}^k + \frac{(1-C_{mi}^k Q_{ij})}{2}\left(1 - \frac{|R_{mj} - O_{ij}^{avg}|}{s_{mj}}\right), & \text{if } |R_{mj} - O_{ij}^{avg}| < s_{mj} \\ C_{mi}^k - \frac{C_{mi}^k Q_{ij}}{2}\left(1 - \frac{s_{mj}}{|R_{mj} - O_{ij}^{avg}|}\right), & \text{if } |R_{mj} - O_{ij}^{avg}| \geq s_{mj} \end{cases}$$

ROCQ: Equations

Quality is the likelihood that actual trust value lies within this range →

$$O_{ij}^{avg} \cdot \left(1 \pm \frac{r}{100}\right)$$

$$Q_{ij} = 1 - B\left(\frac{(N_{ij} - 1)}{(N_{ij} - 1) + t^2}; \frac{1}{2} \cdot (N_{ij} - 1), \frac{1}{2}\right)$$

The *t*-value for the *Student's t-distribution* is given by the following equation:

$$t = \frac{r}{100} \cdot \frac{O_{ij}^{avg} \cdot \sqrt{N_{ij}}}{s_{ij}}$$

System Architecture

- Assume a structured overlay network that uses Distributed Hash Tables
- DHT is used to assign Score Managers (SM)
- Multiple SMs to ensure reliability and guard against malicious SMs
- SM for a peer stores all trust information related to that peer
- Opinions about a peer are reported to all of its SMs

6 score managers
Deterministic threshold of 0.5
Proactive dissemination
Nodes 200
Transactions 50,000





EigenTrust

- The Eigentrust algorithm is based on the notion of transitive trust
- Local Rating: $s_{ij} = \mathrm{sat}(i,j) - \mathrm{unsat}(i,j)$
- Normalized rating: $c_{ij} = \frac{\max(s_{ij}, 0)}{\sum_j \max(s_{ij}, 0)}$
- Local trust values: $t_{ik} = \sum_j c_{ij} c_{jk}$
- Friend of friend: $\vec{t} = (C^T)^n \vec{c_i}$

Note that for large values of n
➔ t will converge to the same vector
Left principal eigenvector of C

EigenTrust: refinements

- The algorithm has faster converge with a set of pre-trusted peers
  - Malicious peers lies

Definitions:

- A_i: set of peers which have downloaded files from peer i
- B_i: set of peers from which peer i has downloaded files

Algorithm:
Each peer i do {
Query all peers $j \in A_i$ for $t_j^{(0)} = p_j$;
repeat
Compute $t_i^{(k+1)} = (1-a)(c_{1i}t_1^{(k)} + c_{2i}t_2^{(k)} + \ldots + c_{ni}t_n^{(k)}) + ap_i$;
Send $c_{ij}t_i^{(k+1)}$ to all peers $j \in B_i$;
Compute $\delta = |t_i^{(k+1)} - t_i^{(k)}|$;
Wait for all peers $j \in A_i$ to return $c_{ji}t_j^{(k+1)}$;
until $\delta < \epsilon$.;
}

- Secure trust storage
  - Nodes might report false trust values for themselves

Distributed version
Source: Sepandar D. Kamvar, Mario T. Schlosser, Hector Garcia-Molina. "The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks". In Proceeding of WWW 2003: 640-651

Practical considerations

- Design of reputation management systems:
  - The results obtained can guide the definition of new schemes
  - The models used for evaluation are general
- Reputation is a useful metric to predict future interactions
- Reputation is self-preservation mechanism
  - protection against behavioral attacks

Conclusions

- Reputation is not a substitute for security
- An objective reputation value is difficult to evaluate
- Reputation is application dependent
- The role of reputation in nodes' interactions is not always clear
- Reputation vs. Risk

➔ Exciting "security" challenges

Further Reading

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Thanks!!!

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